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Finally, legitimate claimants may be unable to recover on policies issued on
the basis of fraudulent statements by soliciting agents.
Despite its shortcomings, industrial insurance serves useful functions. Its
low face value policies, maintained by small, frequent premium payments
makes available to low-income groups life insurance they might not otherwise
buy. Industrial insurance enables them to build savings and provide survivors
with immediate cash to pay the expenses of last illness and burial. And it has
educated large segments of the population to the importance of life insurance
protection.
Vigorous competition can reform industrial insurance. Although group and
Savings Bank life insurance furnish better coverage at lower cost, their com-
petitive impact is weakened by relative unavailability to low-income earners.
Competition among industrial insurers themselves is a more promising ,pur
to reform. Elimination of the major high cost factors, modification oof the
sound health clause, and increased insurers' responsibility for the acts oti
agents would make industrial insurance more appealing to purchasers.
Lowered selling, collection, and handling costs should more than balance the
cost of additional claimants' recoveries. An insurer instituting these reforms
should gain a competitive advantage. Survival of insurers who did not fi-ollow
suit would then depend solely on prospective policyholders' inertia or imper-
fect kmowledge of the improved coverage. If, however, insurers themselves
do not undertake reform, comprehensive legislative control may prove essential.
NOTES
FEDERAL RULE 60(b):
RELIEF FROM CIVIL JUDGMENTS
CouR'Ts long have attempted to reconcile the need for correction of unjust
judgments with the aims of finality in litigation.1 Traditionally, a court
could reopen and modify judgments only during the term in which they
were rendered.2 But courts were loathe to permit unjust judgments to stand
even though the term had expired. To fill the need for post-term relief, a host
of confusing remedial devices haphazardly grew up.3 In time, their use pre-
1. For excellent treatment, see Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief fromt Civil Judg-
inents, 55 YALE L. J. 623 (1946) (hereinafter cited as Moore & Rogers) to appear as
adapted in 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE c. 60 (2d ed. 1952). For developments leading to
Amendments to the Federal Rules, see Drafts of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Notes following Rules 6
and 60 (May 1944); (May 1945); (June 1946). For federal practice problems, con-
sult 8 Cyc. FED. PRoc. c. 37 (2d ed. 1943); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAxcnCE c. 6 (2d ed.
1948) ; 3 id. c. 60 (1938). And see Commentary, Effect of Rile 60(b) on Other Methods
of Relief from Judgment, 4 FED. RULES SERv. 942 (1941) ; Comment, Temporal Aspects
of the Finality of Judgments, 17 U. of CHI. L. REv. 664 (1950); FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
(5th ed. 1925) ; BLACK, JUDGMENTS (1891).
2. E.g, United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914) (criminal action); Bronson v.
Schulten, 104 U.S. 410 (1881) (civil action); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 3255 (1938);
8 Cyc. FED. PROC. § 3588 (1943); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 196 (5th ed. 1925) ; BLAc.,
JUDGMENTS §§ 305-306 (1891).
3. The remedial devices fell generally into four categories:
(1) Writs of audita querela, coram nobis, coram vobis, bill of review, and bill in the
nature of bill of review. See Moore & Rogers, at 659 et seq.; 8 CYc. FED. PRoc. §§ 3599,
3614-5; Simxms, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 710-29 (3d ed. 1938).
(2) Independent actions for relief, based on extrinsic fraud, mistake, and accident.
See Moore & Rogers, at 653 et seq.; 8 CYc. FED. PRoc. §§ 3617-3619; FREEMAN, JUDG-
mENTS c. XXI; BLAcK, JUDGMENTS C. XV. See also note 4 infra.
(3) Inherent power of the court to modify judgments, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (fraud on the court) ; United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (permanent injunction). In some cases the power was
not limited to predictable categories. 1 FAEEMAN, JUDGM~IENTS § 199. For the full extent
to which an "inherent power" theory may nullify limitations on time and subject matter,
see Vermont holdings, Comment, 17 U. oF Cni. L. REv. 664, 666 n. 9 (1950).
(4) Power to disregard void judgments, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877);
or to vacate them, e.g., Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949). See Note, 59
YALE L. J. 345 (1950).
For other devices used in the states to circumvent limitations of the term or statutes,
see Note, 17 U. OF CnIL L. Rav. supra, at 666-8, nn. 8-18).
This haphazard development created considerable confusion. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE c. 60.02 (1939). The devices were "shrouded in ancient lore and mystery".
Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Note following Rule
60(b) (1946). Additional difficulties were created by their origin in a dual procedural
system (law and equity). See Moore & Rogers, at 638, 654 ct seq. "[O]ld precedents ...
NOTES
sented a twofold inadequacy. Correction of an unjust judgment was fre-
quently left to the chance of litigating before a court that could manipulate
an elusive doctrine.4  And, in some cases, the arsenal of remedies was simply
too scant to furnish even flexible courts with a rationale for relief.5
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure failed to cope successfully
with inadequacies in the correction of judgments. The Rules replaced the
finality imposed by the expiration of the term with a six month time limit
on specific motions under Rule 60(b) for correction of judgments.7 But
presented such a baffling surface of conflict and seeming inconsistency that no one could say
with certainty, for example, just what matters could be reached or raised by bill of
review, writ of error coram nobis, or the like." S C.c. FD. Proc. §3524. See alj
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949).
4. For a classic ex-ample, see conflicting holdings on whether relief for "intrinsic"
fraud may be granted by independent action. Compare the majority rule of United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1278) and Dowdy v. Hawfield, 1S9 F2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (relief denied where fraud "intrinsic"), with Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S.
589 (1891) and Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. dc,:icd, 303
U.S. 264 (1939) (relief granted for "intrinsic" fraud). Even if the fraud must be
"extrinsic" to warrant relief, the ambiguity of the "intrinsic-extrinsic" distinction readily
permits manipulation. E.g., Chicago etc. Ry. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799 (Sth Cir. 1920),
cert. denied, 255 U.S. 570 (1921) (relief granted for normally "intrinsic" fraud bacause
of "additional facts"), 21 CoL L. REv. 263 (1921). And see recent California cases
discussed in Moore & Rogers, at 651 n. 80.
5. Even if "these remedies are expanded by judicial construction.., there vill still
be situations, because of the historical growth of the old remedies, where relief will not
be afforded, although these are as meritorious as situations where relief is granted"
Moore & Rogers, at 687. See Wallace v. United States, 142 F2d 240 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
and compare New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Villcuts, 55 F.2d 933 (D. Minn.
1931) (relief granted) with its companion case New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
United States, 2 F. Supp. 648 (D. Minn. 1931) (relief denied). Relief may be blocked by
the technicality that the remedy was an independent action not permitted against the
United States in absence of special statutory authorization. E.g., Zegura v. United
States, 104 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1939) (bill of review); Gherwal v. United States, 46 F.2d
993 (9th Cir. 1931) (independent action in equity) ; Avery v. United States, 12 Wall 304
(U.S. 1870) (audita querela).
6. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
(promulgated December 20, 1937, effective September 16, 1935).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 6 (c) (1937) abolished the effect of the term on the power of a
court to modify its judgments, e.g., Safeway Stores Inc. v. Coe, 136 F-1d 771 (D.C. Cir.
1943).
Provisions for modification of judgments after ex\piration of appeal time were centercJ
in FFD. R. Civ. P. 60 (b):
"(b) MISTAK; INADVETENCE; SmupasSE; ExcuSA.uB INEGLcr. On motion
the court . . . may relieve a party . . . from a judgment, order or proceeding
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, but in no case excecding six
wnonths after such judgment .... A motion under this subdivision doe not affcct
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court (1) to entertain an action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding... "' (emphasis added).
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courts quickly sought to finesse this new time limit and the narrowness of
the stated grounds for relief. Rule 6(b), giving the courts general power
to enlarge time limitations prescribed by the Rules,8 was interpreted to
permit a court to waive the specific six month time limit of 60(b) . Other
courts exercised "inherent power" to control judgments where the "term"
had not expired' ° or where 60(b) did not provide for relief in some tradi-'
tionally remediable circumstances. 1 ' However, most courts refrained from
these interpretive quirks as means of circumventing 60(b)'s limitations.
Rather they read into the Rules the nebulous writs that had traditionally
provided post-term relief.12  In any event, constant attempts to short-circuit
8. FFD. R. Civ. P. 6 (b), prior to its amendment in 1946, read: "(b) When by these
rules ... an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court
for causes shown may, at any time in its discretion ... (2) upon motion permit the act
to be done after the expiration of the specified period where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect. .. "
9. Schram v. O'Connor, 2 F.R.D. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1941). Contra: majority rule of
Wallace v. United States, 142 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 712
(1944) ("The terms of Rule 60 (b) are so emphatic as to preclude the importation of an
exception via Rule 6 (b)."). Nevertheless, Schram was given strong support by the use
of 6 (b) to extend specific time limits of Rules other than 60 (b). E.g., Leishman v.
Ass. Wholesale Electric Co., 318 U.S. 203 (1943) (amendment of findings, Rule 52 (b)) ;
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Snyder, 109 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1940) (filing
record and docketing appeal, Rule 73 (g)). And it was recognized that Rule 6 (b)
lent itself to this interpretation. Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil
Procedure, Note following Rule 6 (b) (1946). But the interpretation was considered
undesirable since it cast in doubt the finality of every specified time limit in the Rules.
Ibid.
10. Cf. Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520 (1943); Boaz v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
N.Y., 146 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1944); Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co., 125 F.2d 213
(9th Cir. 1942). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIc. c. 6.09 (2d ed. 1948). While these
cases did not fall under 60 (b), their rationale was available to circumvent the six month
limit. Resort to the "continued existence" of the term as a source of power over judg-
ments was directly at war with the attempt of Rule 6 (c) to abrogate the effect of the
term. See ibid.
11. E.g., United States v. Sotis, 131 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1942) (void judgment);
International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1945) (modification of
permanent injunction because of changes in circumstances). And see Preveden v. Haht,
36 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (relief after six months where judgment based on
unauthorized stipulation of counsel).
12. Courts generally followed Wallace v. United States, 142 F.2d 240 (2d. Cir.
1944) in holding that the first saving clause of Rule 60(b), supra note 7, preserved
the substance of the traditional writs, c.g., United States v. Certain Lands in Town of
Highlands, 82 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (bill of review); Oliver v. City of
Shattuck, 157 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1946) (audita querela); McGinn v. United States,
2 F.R.D. 562 (D. Mass. 1942) (coram nobis and coram vobis). But this broad inter-
pretation of the saving clauses was controversial, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments etc., Note following Rule 60(b), (May 1944), although the independent action
"in equity" was clearly preserved by the wording of the saving clause.
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old Rule 60(b) were symptoms of its inadequate scope and over-stringent
time limitations.'
3
A new solution emerged in 1948 when Amendments to the Federal Rules
became effective.' 4 Under the Amended Rules, all methods of relief from
judgments after appeal time has expired are centered in a revised Rule
60(b).15 The ancient remedies are abolished, but an independent action
"in equity"' 0 and a proceeding to relieve from fraud on the court are re-
tained.17 In place of the old remedies, the grounds for relief are restated
13. For additional inadequacies of old Rule 60(b) see Moore & Rogers, at 63-91.
14. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States (promulgated December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948).
15. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) now reads:
"(b) MisTAKEs; INAzVRTENcE; Excvs~i.nm NEGLEcr; NEwLY DiscoirT-n Evri-
DEiNc; FRAUD, ETc. On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not
more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding vas entered or
taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided by Section 57 of the Judicial Code, USC, Title 28, § 1655, or
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coran
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."
16. The action provides for relief from extrinsic fraud, see note 4 supra, and accident
or mistake, see note 3 supra.
17. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 23S (1944)
(misrepresentation of evidence), cited by the Advisory Committee as an e.=ample of
fraud on the court. See also Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169
F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949) (counsel employed solely
to "influence". court).
The distinction between fraud on the court and the fraud relieved from by the
independent action is ambiguous. See Moore & Rogers, at 692 n.206. Cases under
the Amended Rule have not distinguished the tw,.o types. E.g., Dowdy v. Hawfield, 1&9
F.2d. 637 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Hadden v. Rumsey Products, 96 F. Supp. 933 (W.D.N.Y.
1951) (suppression of defense). Insofar as fraud in either case must be "eictrinsic" to
warrant relief, e.g., Dowdy v. Hawfield, supra; Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kings-
bury, 175 F.2d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 1949), the distinction between the independent action
and fraud on the court means little, although it may have significance as to what court
may grant relief. See note 20 infra. But where relief is granted for fraud on the
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and broadened. Relief is provided in 60(b) (1) for excusable neglect, inad-
vertence, surprise, and mistake;18 in 60(b) (2) for newly discovered evi-
dence; 10 and in 60(b) (3) for fraud. 20  Motions under 60(b) (1), (2), and
(3) must be made in a reasonable time within one year of judgment. 2
court without reference to the "intrinsic-extrinsic" categories, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra, fraud on the court may become a means to avoid
the "extrinsic" limitation imposed by the independent action. See notes 3 and 4 supra;
Moore & Rogers, at 679-81.
18. Relief has been granted where: a consent order was based on erroneous repre-
sentations of law by OPA officials, Fleming v. I-Iuebsch Laundry, 159 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.
1947) ; counsel consented to an order without authority, In re Gsand, 153 F.2d 1001 (3d
Cir. 1946) ; service was sufficient to give court jurisdiction, but defendant did not in fact
have kncwledge of the pending action, e.g., Tozer v. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242
(3d Cir. 1951) ; defendant erroneously believed that a co-defendant had arranged for his
representation by counsel, Standard Grate Bar Co. v. Defense Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D.
371 (M.D. Pa. 1944); counsel neglected to appear because of full time participation in
another case, United States (for the use of Kantor Bros. Inc.) v. Mutual Construction
Corp., 3 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1943) ; dismissal for lack of prosecution was due to over-
sight of counsel's clerk, Weller v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 2 F.R.D. 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); error of counsel resulted in filing answer one day late, Wolfsohn v. Raab, 11
F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1951) ; impoverished party, attempting to proceed without counsel,
filed answer that did not comply with the Rules, Woods v. Severson, 9 F.R.D. 84 (I).
Neb. 1948) ; failure to plead a previous judgment against plaintiff as res judicata where
plaintiff was one of several hundred parties in the previous suit, Berrios v. Bacjjer, 6
FED. Rur.zs SERv. 60 b. 24, Case 1 (D. Puerto Rico 1942).
Relief has been denied where: error due to an informed choice, Westmoreland Asbestos
Co. Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 136 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1943); Matter of Riedner, 94
F.Supp. 289 (E.D. Wis. 1950); mistake due to subsequent change of law, Safeway Stores
v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Phelan v. Bradbury Bldg. Corp., 7 F.R.D. 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1947); failure to interpose available defense, Colonial Book Co. v. Amqco
School Publications, 48 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) aff'd 142 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
M. Lowenstein & Sons v. American Mfg. Co., 11 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Pa. 1951). Contr:
Berrios v. Baejjer, supra; gross carelessness, e.g., Greenspahn v. Joseph Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 186 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1951) ; no excuse for failure to take appropriate action sooner,
see note 50 infra.
19. E.g., Block v. Thousandfriend, 170 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1948) (judgment on rent
control order set aside where order administratively reversed). Relief has been denied
where: lack of due diligence in discovering the evidence, Greenspahn v. Joseph Seagram
& Sons Inc., 186 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1951) ; evidence known at the time of trial, Di Silvestro
v. United States Veteran's Administration, 9 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); the new
evidence could not have changed result, Union Bleachery v. United States, 176 F.2d 517
(4th Cir. 1949); Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 172 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1949).
20. 60 (b) (3) expressly provides for relief from fraud regardless of the "intrinsic"-
"extrinsic" categories. Thus the primary use of the action for fraud on the court or the
independent action for fraud will now arise where the one year limit on 60(b) (3) has
expired; or the independent action may be used where the moving party does not wish
to apply to the same court that rendered the judgment, e.g., Hadden v. Rumsey Products,
96 F. Supp. 988 (W.D.N.Y. 1951). Relief by motion under 60(b) (3) can only be
obtained from the court that rendered the judgment involved, United States ex reL
Aigner v. Shaughnessy, 175 F.2d 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1949).
21. Motions must be made within a reasonable time even though the stated lflnit has
not expired, e.g., Willard C. Beach Air Brush Co. v. General Motors Corp., 88 F. Supp,
[Vol. 61
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60(b) (4) permits relief from a void judgment;2-' and 60(b) (5) provides for
relief based on changed circumstances subsequent to judgmen - 3 These
grounds are subject to a "reasonable time" limitation.
2-4
60(b) (6) is an unprecedented addition to the Rules.2 5 This is a catch-all
clause to permit correction "for any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." 'Motions under 60(b) (6) are subject only to a
"reasonable time" requirement. Ackerman v. U. S.2 and Klapprott v. U. S.-
are the Supreme Court's only interpretations of 60(b) (6). In both cases
petitioner sought relief from a denaturalization judgment entered approxdi-
mately four years prior to his motion.2 In treating these motions under
849 (D.N.J. 1950). For general interpretation of the reasonable time limitation see
p. 86 and notes 49, 50 infra. Rule 6 (b), as amended, cannot be used to extend the time
limit in Rule 60(b). FED. R. Crv. P. 6 (b) (1948).
22. E.g., French Renovating Co. v. Ray Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1949).
And see note 3 supra.
23. E.g., Grand Union Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1948) (banlruptcy
proceeding injunction modified) ; Block v. Thousandfriend, 170 F2d 428 t2d Cir. 194S),
supra note 19; Tobin v. Alma Mills, 92 F. Supp. 728 (W.D.S.C. 1950) (relief from
ten year old statutory injunction); Pierce Oil Corp. v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 619
(E.D. Va. 1949) (relief granted where judgment on which discontinuance based was
reversed).
24. See p. 86 and notes 49, 50 infra. Traditionally, a void judgment could h2 set
aside at any time. See 1 FEMzixA, JuGa!E.NTS § 322. Thus the application of a "rea-
sonable time" limitation is anomalous here. However, in respect to relief based Un pQt-
judgment events, the "reasonable time!' limit generally governed in the past since this
relief was equitable and subject to the doctrine of laches. See Moore & Rogers, at
643 n.64, 679, 668, n.162.
25. 60(b) (6) is a dean break with the past not to be hamstrung by traditional
limitations. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949). And at least
one commentator regards the clause as a "dramatic change" in the correction of judg-
ments. Comment, 17 U. op C. L. REv. 664, 670 (1950). But insofar as 60 (b) (6),
coupled with the remainder of 60 (b), insures that every conceivable ground for relief
is covered, see note 31 infra, it simply restates the court's previous plenary power, see
note 2 supra, and extends its application beyond the term. However, 60(b) (6) will
expand previous relief where used to grant relief in situations never covered by the
old post-term remedies, or where, in effect, it extends the time limits of these remedies.
Moreover, 60(b) (6), as well as the rest of 60(b), provides unprecedented facility in
administration.
26. 340 U. S. 193 (1950).
27. 335 U. S. 601, modified, 336 U. S. 942 (1949).
28. In Ackerman,, interned petitioner had defended but had not appealed. He
alleged mental distress, poverty, and reliance on the misleading advice of his naturaliza-
tion custodian who told him not to appeal and that he would be released after the var.
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 2034 (1950). A co-defendant successfully
appealed. Keilbar v. United States, 144 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1944). But the facts in
the co-defendant's case were clearly distinguishable from Ackermann's situation. See
United States v. Ackermann, 53 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Texas 1943). 178 F2d. 933, 9.26
(5th Cir. 1949).
In Klapproft, petitioner alleged failure to defend due to poverty, illness, incarcera-
tion, and preoccupation with defense of other actions; that he had attempted to procure
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60(b) (6), the Court enunciated the principle that 60(b) (6) and other
clauses of 60(b) are mutually exclusive. 29  Consequently, petitioners were
required to demonstrate "more than" the excusable neglect which might have
accorded relief under 60(b) (1) had the motions been made within a year.8-
Apparently, this was the only reasonable reading of 60(b)(6). It was in
accord with both the intent of the draftsmen3 ' and the wording of the clause.A'1
Moreover, other portions of Rule 60(b) dictated this interpretation. The
one year limit on 60(b) (1), (2), and (3) would be meaningless were
60(b) (6) applicable to situations falling under these clauses.8 3
But the Court's principle that 60(b) (6) and other clauses of 60(b) are
mutually exclusive has not been adhered to in practice. Court interpretations
counsel by a letter which government agents had taken from him; and that other counsel
had promised to defend for him, but had not. His failure to request relief sooner
allegedly was due to his imprisonment and defense in other proceedings. Klapprott V.
United States, 335 U. S. 601, 604-6 (1949).
29. "(T)he one year limitation of 60 (b) (1) would control if no more than 'neglect'
was disclosed by the petition. In that event the petitioner could not avail himself of tile
broad 'any other reason' clause of 60 (b) .... In simple English, the language of tile
'other reason' clause, for alt reasons except the five particularly specifidd, vests power
in courts ... to enable them to vacate judgments. . . ." Klapprott v. United States, 335
U.S. 601, 614-5 (1949) (emphasis added). The concurring opinion agreed "substantially",
id. at 619-20; as did Justice Reed, id. at 625-6, and Justice Frankfurter, id. at 630-1, in
separate dissenting opinions. Thus, while split on other aspects of the case, seven of the
eight participating members of the Court agreed to the majority reading of 60(b) (0).
In Ackermann, the principle was not enunciated explicitly. But the opinion noted
that "extraordinary circumstances" were necessary to qualify for relief under 60 (b) (6).
It cited in full that part of Klapprott which asserted that Klapprott's situation could
not be "fairly or logically classified as mere 'neglect' on his part." 340 U.S. 193, 199-200
(1950). Apparently, the Court resubscribed to the mutual exclusiveness of 60(b) (6)
and 60(b) (1).
30. Klapprott's allegations demonstrated "more than" excusable neglect. The case
was remanded for findings, 336 U.S. 942 (1949), but Klapprott failed to prove his
allegations. 9 F.R.D. 282 (D. N.J. 1949).
Ackermann's motion under 60 (b) (6) was denied. The Court found that he had
"no right" to rely on the custodian's advice, and that his decision to forego appeal was a
calculated risk. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197-8 (1950). Klapprott
was distinguished on its facts, id. at 199-200.
31. Although no Committee Notes were appended to Rule 60(b) (6), the pro-
ponents of 60(b) in its final form, Moore & Rogers, at 693 n.272, commented that since
the Rule was intended to be comprehensive, some provision was necessary to cope with
situations not specifically enumerated. Thus 60 (b) (6) was intended to be a "general
residual clause ... to cover unforseen contingencies." id. at 692.
32. FFD. R. Cry. P. 60(b) (6), vepra note 15. As Justice Reed pointed out: the
word "other" in 60(b) (6) would be meaningless if any different interpretation
were accorded the clause. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 626 (1949)
(dissenting opinion).
33. If 60(b) (6) is applied to situations normally falling under 60(b) (1), (2), and
(3), these clauses are superfluous. The one year time limit of these clauses could be dis-




of the excusable neglect provisions in 60(b) (1) have been so broad that,
when read together with 60(b) (2) through (5), apparently few fact situa-
tions remain to call 60(b) (6) into play. 4 Nevertheless, courts immediately
resorted to 60(b) (6) as a mandate "to accomplish justice."35 In many
situations they ignored entirely the mutual exclusiveness of 60(b) (6) and
other clauses of 60(b). 3' On other occasions, even where the principle vas
34. For the broad federal decisions under 60(b) (1) and unamended 60(b), see note
IS supra. However, because of the recency of the Rules, the picture provided by the
federal decisions is necessarily incomplete.
Since the provisions of 60(b) (1) (and unamended 60 (b)) were taken almost ver-
batim from CALIFORNIA CODE OF Civni, PRAc'ric § 473 (Deering 1937), California prac-
tice has been considered substantially adopted by the Rule. Fiske Y. Buder, 125 F.2d
841, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1942) ; United States v. Mutual Construction Corp., 3 F.R.D. 27.,
228 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Ledwith v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D. 539, 542 (D. Neb. 1942). See also
Moore & Rogers, at 631-2. And the long history of the excusable neglect provisions in
California demonstrates its meaning as known to the draftsmen of Rule 60 (b). In
California, §473 has been used to grant relief in many situations similar to those that
have thus far arisen under the Rules. See 3 Moom, FEmNnr. PRAcncE 3230 ct seq.
(1938). But it has also been applied to situations undealt with by federal courts
where failure to take appropriate action vas due to extreme hardship or impos-
sibility. Eg., Plax v. Pla.x, 134 Cal. 263, 193 Pac. 242 (1920) (illiteracy and
ignorance of English language) ; Patterson v. Keeney, 165 Cal. 465, 132 Pac. 1043 (1913)
(movant arrested while ill in bed, hospitalized as prisoner, served with summons
immediately taken from him and not returned during his imprisonment until after default
judgment); Burns v. Scoofy, 98 Cal. 271, 33 Pac. S6 (1893) (counse's preoccupation
over murder of brother) ; Fulweiler v. Hog's Back Consolidated Mining Co., 83 Cal. 126,
23 Pac. 65 (1890) (unforseeable delay in travel); Hicks v. Sanders, 40 Cal. App. 2d
211, 104 P.2d 549 (1940) (attorney on vacation. movant hospitalized) ; Stone v.
McWilliams, 43 Cal. App. 490 (1919) (blindness, old age, and illiteracy); Baylor v.
Solstein, 2 Cal. Unrep. 846, 16 Pac. 893 (18,q) (death of counsel). Readings of
similar provisions in other states uniformly buttress the California decisions. 1 FREE M.,
JUDG &ENT § 241 et sCq., BLacx, JUTDGMENTS §§ 335-343. Since 60 (b) (1) thus covers
situations ranging from simple oversights to the physical impossibility of defense, it is
difficult to imagine what circumstances might be sufficiently "extraordinary" to con-
stitute "more than" excusable neglect.
35. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949) ; Fleming v. Mante 10
F.r\D. 391 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
36. E.g., Nelns v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 11 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ohio 1951);
Weilbacher v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) ; Fleming v. Mante, 10
F.R.D. 391 (N.D. Ohio 1950); United States v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 506 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
But cf. Woods v. Severson, 9 F.R.D. 84 (D. Neb. 1948) (60(b) (6) disregarded
where relief could be granted under 60(b) (1)). In some cases courts granted relief
under 60(b)(6) simultaneously with other clauses of 60(b), e.g., Tozer v. Krause
Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) (60(b)(1)); Grand Union Equipment Co.
v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1943) (60(b) (5)); Block v. Thousandfriend, 170
F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1948) (60(b) (2) and (5)); Tobin v. Alma Mills, 92 F. Supp. 723
(W.D.S.C. 1950) (60(b)(5)). Of course, if relief is given under 60(b)(6) and
on another ground under some other clause, the principle is not in fact ignored. How-
ever, if this were true in the above situations, the courts gave no indication of it. But
see Pierce Oil Corp. v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Va. 1949).
1952]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
announced, it was given only lip service.37 Consequently, almost every grant
of relief under 60(b) (6) could have fallen under 60(b) (1) or other clauses
of 60(b).
39
The effect of the cases under 60(b) (6) establishes the clause as a way
of circumventing the one year time limit in 60(b) (1), (2), and (3).39
Insofar as relief within one year of judgment is incorrectly categorized under
60(b) (6), no immediate violence is done to the one year limit.40 But these
decisions establish precedent fact situations under 60(b) (6) for future use
of the clause in similar cases arising later than one year from judgment.4 t
Moreover, 60(b) (6) has already been used to circumvent directly the one
year limit.4 2 No less an authority than the Supreme Court has led the way
in its Klapprott decision.
43
37. E.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), first announcing the
principle of mutual exclusion. Yet every reason cited to establish petitioner's conduct as
"more than" excusable neglect has itself been a ground for relief under "excusable
neglect" provisions. Compare Klapprott v. United States, supra, with cases cited note
34 supra. Indeed, if the Court had followed its own rationale and examined prior de-
cisions, it would have discovered one factually on all fours with the Klapprott case.
Patterson v. Keeney, 165 Cal. 465, 132 Pac. 1043 (1913), supra note 34.
38. Compare United States v. Backofen, 176 F.2d 263 (3d Cr. 1949) (inprisoient,
lack of funds, mental preoccupation) with Patterson v. Keeney, 165 Cal. 465, 132 Pac. 1043
(1913), supra note 34. Compare Nelms v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 11 F.RD. 441
(N.D. Ohio 1951) (counsel acted on authorization of plaintiff's husband in consenting to
dismissal judgment without plaintiff's knowledge or consent), with In re Gsand, 153 F.2d
1001 (3d Cir. 1946), supra note 18; Compare Fleming v. Mante, 10 F.R.D. 391 (ND.
Ohio 1950) (impoverished defendant hospitalized and notice of entry of judgment prob-
ably "meant nothing" to him), with Patterson v. Keeney, supra and Plax v. Plax, 184
Cal. 263, 193 Pac. 242 (1920), supra note 34, and Swisshelm Gold Silver Co. v. Farwell,
59 Ariz. 162, 124 P.2d 544, 547 (1942) ; Compare United States v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 506
(M.D. Pa. 1949) (judgment rendered without actual notice and entered by clerl
without authority), with Tozer v. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951), supra
note 18, and Rule 60(b) (4), supra notes 15 and 22, and Rehfield v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., 187 Fed. 810 (3d Cir. 1911) (judgment entered by clerk without authority void).
Compare Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 95 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. Iowa 1951)
(oversight in failure to raise motion to transfer cause prior to dismissal for improper
venue) with cases cited note 18 supra. In Tozer v. Krause Milling Co., supra, the court
itself acknowledged that relief could be granted on the same ground under 60 (b) (6)
and 60(b) (1). See also cases note 36 supra. And see note 37 su pra. Bat cf. Weilbacher
v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) for the one fact situation not
blanketed by 60(b) (1) through (5).
39. See note 21 supra and text.
40. E.g., Tozer v. Krause Milling Co., 189 F2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 95 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
41. See note 40 supra. For an excellent example of the use of factual precedent to cir-
cumvent the limit, see United States v. Backofen, 176 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1949), relying solely
on the factual similarity of United States v. Klapprott, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), to grant relief.
42. See e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); United States v.
Backofen, 176 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Nehns v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 11 F.R.D.
441 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Fleming v. Mante, 10 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. Ohio 1950) and
discussion in note 38 supra.
43. See note 37 supra, 45 in!ra.
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NOTES
The difficulty with the Amended Rule is its failure to provide sufficient
and clear-cut grounds for relief later than one year from judgment. 60(b) (6)
does afford a way to avoid the one year limit of 60(b) (1), (2), and (3).
But it is not a desirable method for generally providing relief after one year.
The chance for relief is once more too dependent upon the flezibility of a
court.4 - And the decisions distending the clause are a travesty on clear
thought.4 5 True, a one year time limit on 60(b) (6) would clear up the
confusion by eliminating the opportunity to distort the clause. But the
misuse of 60(b) (6) to circumvent time limitations simply demonstrates
traditional judicial ingenuity in grappling with inadequate means for remedy-
ing injustice.4" A one year limit on 60(b) (6) would merely shift the problem
by forcing courts to distort other parts of Rule 60(b). 7
44. Relief under 60(b)(6) in evasion of the one year limit of 60(b)(1), (2),
and (3) will depend upon the chance of litigating before a court that is willing either
to indulge in the word juggling of the Klapprott case, see note 37 supra and note 45 inlra,
or to ignore entirely the exclusiveness of 60(b) (6) with other clauses, see note 36
.supra.
45. E.g., Klapprott v. United States 335 U.S. 601 (1949). The Court concluded
that petitioner showed "more than" excusable neglect since his conduct was not "neglect"
at all, i.e., petitioner was deprived of any reasonable opportunity to defend. Id. at 613-614.
But "mere neglect" is not in itself a ground for relief under 60(b) (1) or similar
provisions, since the "neglect" must be "excusable". e I.edwith v Sturzan, 2 IFR D.
539 (D. Neb. 1942) ; Gorman v. California Transit Co., 199 Cal. 246, 249 Pac. 923 (1926).
In determining what makes the "neglect" "excusable", the courts have consistently adopted
the test of whether petitioner's conduct was reasonable. See e.g., Hughes v. Wright, (4
Cal. App. 2d 897, 901, 149 P.2d 392, 395 (1944) (movant must show a situation where
he is "unexpectedly placed, to his injury without any fault or negligence of his own
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.") But this is precisely the
standard adopted in Klapprott to show "more than" excusable neglect. Thus, if the
Klapprott standard were to be used, 60(b)(6) would completely swallow up 60(b)
(1) and its one year time limitation. Since Klapprott, reasonably read, intended to leep
60(b) (1) and (6) apart, the Klapprott standard defeats the rule of the case.
46. "Piercing the veneer of phrases, the decisions disclose that federal courts have
always exercised broad discretion to right obvious injustices ... even if technicalities
must be twisted to do so. .. ." 8 Cyc. Fm. PRoc. § 3584. And see Moore & Rogers, at
6S; pp. 76-9 su pra; note 3 supra.
47. 60 (b (4) and (5) are only applicable in limited situations that do not overlap
with any other clauses of 60 (b), see notes 15. 22, 23 supra, and thus are not generally
available for post-year relief. But see Block v. Thousandfriend, 170 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.
1948), note 19 supra, for a possible use of 60(b) (5) to circumvent the one year limit
for relief for newly discovered evidence. The independent action, see notes 3, 4, 16 supra,
might be stretched to cover a wide range of situations similar to those comprehended by
60(b) (1), and (3); but it is restricted by a requirement that the fraud accident or
mistake relieved from be "extrinsic," see sources cited note 3 supra, and discussion note
4 supra. Insofar as fraud alone is concerned, it is possible that an action for fraud on
the court may circumvent this "extrinsic" requirement. See note 17 supra. However, as
long as the "intrinsic-extrinsic" distinction limits the independent action, its use for
post-year relief will remain a question of confusion and chance. For, "at times it is a
journey into futility to attempt a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic matter."
Moore & Rogers, at 658. And see notes 3, 4 sn pra.
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